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Consent for the diagnosis of preclinical dementia states: a review 
ABSTRACT  [247 words] 
It is now possible to detect the pathology of Alzheimer’s disease (AD) many years before 
symptoms and signs otherwise become manifest. Biomarkers of disease include evidence of 
amyloid and tau in the cerebrospinal fluid and neuroimaging which (for instance) allows 
amyloid in the brain to be visualized. There is, thus, a preclinical state in which it is possible 
to identify Alzheimer’s pathology long before there is clinical evidence of disease. Much 
research focuses on this preclinical state because it seems likely that treatments will be more 
effective before the disease is established. This means that researchers can discover 
Alzheimer’s pathology some years before the person is at risk of developing the condition. In 
memory clinics, too, people may present with early (prodromal) symptoms which do not yet 
amount to a dementia syndrome (e.g. mild cognitive impairment), yet biomarker evidence 
that dementia is highly likely to develop. This is problematic because people will be required 
to consent to the disclosure of findings that indicate an uncertain risk of an alarming disease. 
We carried out a scoping review of the issues that arise in connection with a “diagnosis” of 
preclinical dementia. We identified four themes in the literature: stigma; ethical issues; 
psychological burden; and language. We shall discuss these themes and related issues that 
emerge to do with meaning, medicalization, virtues and values. More research is now 
required to understand these issues in detail, where the emphasis should be on the breadth of 
research, which must be biopsychosocial and ethical.  
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Consent for the diagnosis of preclinical dementia states: a review 
1. Introduction  
Within the last ten years, new concepts for understanding Alzheimer’s disease (AD) have 
emerged [1,2]. Although these concepts differ in detail and are still evolving, there is general 
agreement that AD is a continuum from a preclinical state via a prodromal condition to full-
blown Alzheimer’s dementia.  
Alzheimer’s dementia is the well-recognized condition in which there is an acquired global 
impairment of cognitive function which is severe enough to affect activities of daily living, 
aspects of personality and behaviour, where the typical Alzheimer’s pathology can be 
demonstrated post-mortem. Concepts such as mild cognitive impairment (MCI) emerged 
subsequently to describe the (prodromal) state, where limited cognitive impairment did not 
fulfil the criteria for full-blown dementia and did not affect activities of daily living. 
However, not all cases of MCI progress to dementia [3].  
The new idea is that of a preclinical state, extending over many years, during which the 
person is asymptomatic but has detectable pathology. In fact, it has been known for some 
time that an albeit small group of people (less than 1.5% of those with Alzheimer’s dementia) 
carry a dominant gene for AD and remain pre-symptomatic for many years. The new concept 
has emerged because it is now technically possible to detect Alzheimer’s pathology 
preclinically. A variety of biomarkers allow much greater (albeit not perfect) accuracy in 
terms of predicting that a person will develop Alzheimer’s dementia because of current 
asymptomatic pathology. Thus, amyloid (one of the hallmarks of Alzheimer’s pathology) can 
be detected in the brain using both neuroimaging and analysis of the cerebrospinal fluid 
(CSF). Tau, another protein (like amyloid) found in the brains of people with Alzheimer’s 
dementia, can also be detected in the CSF (and will soon be detectable by neuroimaging). 
There are other morphological changes in the brain that are more typical of Alzheimer’s than 
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of other dementias. These biomarkers, along with genetic markers for susceptibility such as 
the ApoE ε4 allele, give meaning to the concept of “non-dementia AD”. 
Inasmuch as this is new, therefore, it raises new ethical challenges. For it is now perfectly 
possible that a researcher will learn that a person has significant Alzheimer’s pathology in the 
absence of overt symptoms or signs of the disease. This possibility is stimulating ethical 
interest [4]. We decided to review the literature to consider issues around the identification of 
preclinical dementia. 
2. Methods  
2.1 Sources of Information 
We searched the databases PubMed, ScienceDirect and PsychSource separately. 
2.2 Search terms and parameters 
Our search used the terms “asymptomatic at risk for AD”, “asymptomatic AD”, “pre-
dementia”, “preclinical dementia”, “presymptomatic AD”, “prodromal AD”, “mild cognitive 
impairment” and “MCI” each in combination with “consent” AND “diagnosis”. 
The search was limited to title and abstract, but any research methodology was accepted 
including meta-analyses, randomised controlled trials, observational studies, reviews and 
opinion pieces. The search was further limited to papers written in English, involving humans 
and published between 2006 and 2016. Age and type of potential dementia were not 
exclusion criteria. This was a scoping review in which we were concerned with broad topics 
and a variety of study designs without an intention to address a specific research question and 
without consideration of the quality of the studies identified [5].  
2.3 Selection criteria 
Papers included in this review were those specifically concerned with the consent for a 
diagnosis of pre-dementia states and the surrounding issues regarding disclosure of 
information and its implications. Papers concerning the consent for a diagnosis of clinical 
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dementia were excluded; those concerned solely with capacity, screening measures and 
predictive prognosis were also not considered. We restricted our review specifically to 
preclinical states. 
2.4 Synthesis 
After the initial literature search, the papers were read in full by each member of the team.  
We then met to discuss emergent issues and themes in greater detail. Through our discussions 
numerous issues emerged; a narrative or descriptive account of the literature coalesced 
around four main themes. 
3. Results [950] 
The papers we identified mainly referred to AD, which was therefore the focus of our 
analysis. After the exclusion of duplicate papers, our search identified ten papers: seven were 
opinion pieces or non-systematic reviews [6,7,8,10,11,13,15]; three were based on empirical 
studies [9,12,14], one of which was a Delphi study [9]. The four themes to emerge were: 
stigma; ethical issues; psychological burden; and language. We shall discuss each theme in 
turn. However, the themes inevitably overlap. 
3.1 Stigma  
One significant concern is that preclinical identification of AD will lead to stigma [11,15]. 
Much of this concern reflects experience and research involving MCI and AD dementia. 
Stigma may show itself in a variety of forms, from discrimination in the work place to 
difficulty gaining insurance [8,9,10,15]. There may also be interpersonal stigma [9], public or 
social stigma [11], involving social isolation and distancing [10,15]. Johnson and Karlawish 
cite research that shows it is not AD itself that elicits stigma, but ‘the label’s association with 
expectations of certain future decline’ [10]. They also identify civic rights and privileges, 
such as driving and voting, as further areas where there might be discrimination [10]. The 
negative perception of the AD label can become internalised causing self-stigma [7,11]. 
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Stigma can also be directed at those who care for people living with dementia [11]. Worries 
about stigma have led some to suggest the need for new legislation around privacy and 
confidentiality [7,8,10]. It would seem unjust that people altruistic enough to participate in 
research should then find their ability to gain employment or insurance compromised because 
of findings with uncertain but potentially devastating consequences. 
3.2 Ethical issues  
Stigma is, of course, an ethical and political issue as well as a social one. Ethical concerns 
loomed large in the literature, provoked by the ‘prognostic uncertainty and lack of clinical 
utility’ associated with preclinical identification of AD [9]. Much of the discussion centred 
on the (uncertain) risks, burdens and benefits of early “diagnosis” [6,11]. To discuss relevant 
ethical issues, the four principles of medical ethics can be applied [16].  
First, research aimed at preclinical identification of AD is predicated on the possibility of 
beneficence: the aim is to do good by treating AD early [6,15]. Interestingly, however, 
Dubois and colleagues ‘failed to find studies clearly focused on the benefits for patients, 
carers, or society of a timely diagnosis at the prodromal stage, before dementia sets in’ [11]. 
One possible benefit of a ‘timely diagnosis’ might be the possibility of advance care 
planning, end-of-life decision-making, the opportunity to change unhealthy lifestyles and 
seek better medical care [11]. Certainly, the diagnosis of dementia leads to treatment and 
support, so similar benefits may follow early identification of AD pathology [15]. Also, 
people who are known (e.g.) to be negative for cerebral amyloid (based on neuroimaging) 
will not be used for studies aimed at treating amyloid, which is therefore a benefit to them, 
just as knowing that you are free of disease is good in general [13].  
Secondly, the burdens associated with disclosure of biomarker positivity (i.e. the knowledge 
that AD pathology is present albeit asymptomatically), avoidance of which is a matter of the 
principle of non-maleficence, will necessitate careful psychological preparation and follow-
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up [10]. This requirement is likely to diminish over time as therapeutics improve, as has been 
seen in screening for HIV status [6]. But non-maleficence, avoiding harm, is already used 
(rightly or wrongly) as an excuse not to inform patients of their diagnosis of AD [7]. Many 
people do not wish to undergo diagnostic testing, ‘perhaps for fear of receiving bad news 
with little prospect of effective treatment’, but equally ‘some people are willing to pay for 
diagnostic clarity’ [14]. 
Several papers mention a consequentialist framework in talking of the ethical issues around 
disclosure. Thus, diagnostic disclosure may have some utility, but this must be ‘situated in a 
broader consequentialist framework … the central premise of which is that one’s approach 
toward disclosure be grounded in the probable impact the information will have on a given 
patient’ [7]. 
In this connection, almost all the papers we reviewed cited the Risk Evaluation and Education 
for Alzheimer’s Disease (REVEAL) project. Participants in REVEAL, who were told their 
risk of AD based on ApoE status, were no more likely to develop anxiety, depression or test-
related distress than those who received information about their risk of AD solely based on 
age, family history and gender [17].  At follow-up one year after disclosure, the participants 
seemed more sensitive both to the limitations around being told their genetic risk and to the 
possibility of discrimination, but the benefits in favour of testing still strongly outweighed the 
disbenefits [18]. The importance of disclosing information in an appropriate manner to 
cognitively normal older people who may nevertheless have AD pathology led Harkins and 
colleagues, using a Delphi method, to develop a process with ongoing monitoring of mood 
and safety [9]. As Johnson and Karlawish suggest, the ‘empirical data on the consequences of 
disclosure is important for ethics questions about the advisability of disclosure’ [10]. 
Lim and colleagues undertook a study in which amyloid status, determined by positron 
emission tomography (PET) scanning, was disclosed to participants [12]. Although 63 
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healthy older people enrolled in the scanning study, only 11 were willing to know their 
amyloid status. Only four of these had increased levels of amyloid. The study demonstrated 
no adverse psychological effects from disclosure and the four with increased amyloid made 
positive changes to their lifestyles, with more exercise and changes to their diet [12]. 
Being told whether you are biomarker positive and, therefore, your risk status for AD 
dementia is also relevant to the third principle of medical ethics, autonomy. Telling people in 
the right way about their risks is a matter of showing respect for the individual’s autonomy 
[9]. It is a way of empowering them [15]. Respect for autonomy also underpins the 
imperative that people should have the capacity to give full consent to studies that lead to 
disclosures about risk [10,13]. Autonomy is respected by the process of shared decision-
making [15]. ‘Respect for persons’ is a basic requirement for clinical research even where 
participants lack autonomy [13]. One way to ensure a person’s autonomous prior choices are 
honoured in the context of declining capacity is to consider encouraging the use of ‘research 
advance directives’ [10, but also see 19, section 8.44].  
Fourthly, there are issues of justice [8,15]. There is the common enough issue that large 
studies are costly and there ought to be some hope of success before they are pursued. Not 
only will studies use material resources, but if they are also psychologically burdensome for 
the participants, this should be considered. However, a much weightier consideration is the 
possibility that such studies, if (but only if) successful, would bring about significant savings 
in that the onset of dementia could be postponed, its progression could be slowed and 
potentially it could be cured [8]. 
3.3 Psychological burden  
Worries about inducing anxiety and depression in those to whom their biomarker status is 
disclosed are commonly mentioned in the literature [6,7,11,13,15]. Psychological burden, or 
‘existential dread’ [20, cited in 6], is not only to do with biomarker disclosure being stressful 
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at the time, but is also that it will cause ‘fear for the future’ [8], which may worsen [12]. 
Hence the need to screen for anxiety, depression and distress before, during and after 
disclosure [8,9]. This is necessary both for research purposes (to learn who is affected etc.) 
and for therapeutic intervention. In addition, psychoeducation is required to help people deal 
with the uncertainty surrounding any disclosure of risk and the implications for them and for 
their families [6,9,12,15].  
Comparisons are sometimes made with Huntington’s disease, including over the risk of 
suicide [13], where suicide is seen as a consequence of the psychological burden that follows 
disclosure [11]. Molinuevo and colleagues suggest that the main risks of disclosure, ‘include 
placing a cloud of uncertainty over participants that affect their daily lives …’ [13]. Knowing 
your biomarker status early means that you have a longer period of burdensome uncertainty. 
Molinuevo and colleagues also suggest that disclosure should not occur in observational 
studies, unless the studies are of the impact of disclosure, because the only effect is to cause 
uncertainty; whereas disclosure in intervention studies is necessary and protects those who 
are unlikely to benefit from treatment [13]. 
3.4 Language  
The need for good communication – communication that allows some sort of clarity despite 
the ambiguity of diagnostic terms that relate to ‘disease defined by a dimensional risk of 
impairment rather than a categorical pathology’ [10] – is central to the theme of language 
[6,7,13]. Good communication requires accurate, unambiguous information [9,12]. It also 
requires the clinician to be able to determine whether or not the person wishes to know the 
information [15]. But the theme goes further. The choice of words is not solely about clear 
communication; it is also about decision-making on a broader scale involving all concerned 
[15]. And it is about our concepts of disease: ‘our language for talking about AD will likely 
change’; instead of AD we may speak about ‘brain amyloidopathy’ [6]. Karlawish continues: 
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‘And yet, such terms cannot elide an essential fact. They denote a dreaded risk: developing 
dementia’ [6]. 
4. Discussion 
Inevitably, our review has demonstrated a good deal of ethical concern around the 
identification of preclinical dementia. Worries about stigma, about the psychological burden 
of disclosure of biomarker status and about the need for good communication are all driven 
by ethical concerns. In its recent discussion paper on ethical issues linked to changing 
definitions in relation to AD, Alzheimer Europe identified notions such as the representation 
of health and disease, personal identity and personhood, citizenship and equality, amongst 
others, as worthy of consideration [4]. No doubt our own analysis could be developed further. 
Our scoping review has limitations. We could have expanded our search terms, e.g. to 
include ‘disclosure’. We did not search many databases. Concepts such as ‘preclinical 
dementia’ are relatively new so that the use of these terms is inconsistent and empirical 
studies infrequent. Nevertheless, several points emerge for further discussion. 
First, in the empirical study of the effects of disclosure of amyloid status, Lim and colleagues 
found reassuring results [12]. But of the 63 eligible, only 11 participated in the study and of 
these only four showed increased amyloid. So this was a small and selective group. Questions 
remain concerning the 52 people who were not willing to participate in the study. Whose 
voices do we hear concerning what is to be regarded as good practice or acceptable research? 
Molinuevo and colleagues talk of the ‘public’s values’ [13]; but so far we have little idea 
what these might be. This contrasts with our awareness that most people with AD dementia 
do wish to know their diagnosis [21]. 
Secondly, a related point concerns the limited range of ethical approaches or theories applied 
to the issues under consideration. Consequentialism must inevitably give great weight to the 
possibility of therapeutic advance (if not cure). But neither consequentialism nor the four 
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principles cover all the relevant moral territory [22]. If we add virtue ethics into the mix, we 
must then consider prudence (or practical wisdom), fortitude, courage, honesty, charity, 
diligence, kindness, humility, patience, generosity, fidelity and so on. A more nuanced 
discussion would need to consider these dispositions in relation to researchers and research 
participants. It may be that good reasons – prudent, brave, kind reasons – emerge why a 
person might or might not wish to know his or her risk of AD dementia. 
Thirdly, discussion of the virtues suggests a notion of the good life, of what it is to flourish as 
a human being. Some might see medicalization of many aspects of living as the antithesis of 
the good life. It can be argued that where there is no dysfunction or disability it is wrong to 
use the term “disease”. On this view, it does not make sense to speak of “asymptomatic AD”, 
particularly because AD pathology can be present in normal individuals and will not 
inevitably determine that someone develops the disease. Biomarker positivity, therefore, need 
not be regarded as a disease state [23]. To call it such is to encourage a cultural shift that need 
not occur. A moderate approach might be to suggest that further research is required into just 
what public values amount to in these debates. 
Finally, language suggests meaning. We need to make sure that participants in studies 
understand what the language of science means and that scientists understand participants’ 
true concerns. But we also need to understand the individual nature of meaning. Several of 
the papers in our review mentioned shared decision-making [14.15]. The point about shared 
decision-making, however, is that both parties in the decision must really hear and understand 
each other. Their meanings must be shared. (Ownership of the information to be shared is 
another underlying issue we have not discussed [24].) What is important, therefore, is the 
nature of the individual encounter, whether this be in the clinic or in the research laboratory. 
5. Conclusion 
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Our scoping review of the issues that arise concerning a disclosure of preclinical dementia 
has identified four themes in the literature: stigma; ethical issues; psychological burden; and 
language. We have gone on to argue that we need to know more about the values that might 
be at play here (including the public’s values), which will touch on attitudes towards 
medicalization, on what we regard as normal or as pathological and, consequently, on what 
counts in the good life. This will require more nuanced analysis of the ethical issues involved 
and more research to understand these issues in detail, where the emphasis should be on the 
breadth and depth of research. The importance of the subject and of what is at stake requires 
an interdisciplinary, biopsychosocial and ethical, quantitative and qualitative approach. As 
Jason Karlawish put it: ‘The discovery of preclinical AD may be how we prevent the tsunami 
of dementia, but we must not drown in the challenges created by our own discovery’ [6]. 
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